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ABSTRACT
TWO ROUTES TO PERSPECTIVE-TAKING-
TESTING A NEW MODEL
MAY 1996
CYNTHIA MCPHERSON FRANTZ, B.A., WILLIAMS COLLEGE
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Ronnie Janoff-Bulman
This study tests a new model that posits two routes to multiple
perspective-taking (MPT): via automatic processing when affective
responses to two people are more balanced, and via effortful
processing when affective responses are less balanced.
Undergraduates read descriptions of parent-adolescent conflicts.
Instructions to be fair (effortful), to respond honestly (control), or to
perform a distracting memory task (automatic) manipulated
processing level. Background information describing a likable parent
(balanced affect) or an unlikable parent (unbalanced affect)
manipulated affective response. Independent raters coded responses
for the number of statements supporting each perspective.
Participants who liked both characters exhibited more MPT than
those who did not. Contrary to expectations, overloaded participants
exhibited the most MPT, while effortful participants exhibited the
least MPT. The study provides partial support for the model,
demonstrating the important role of liking in perspective-taking. The
model needs revision to account for motivational effects, however.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Human relations run most smoothly when people consider the
thoughts and feelings of others before they act. Indeed, much
psychological research has demonstrated that taking another person's
perspective increases a wide array of pro-social outcomes such as
helping behavior (Coke, Batson & McDavis, 1978), problem solving
ability (Falk & Johnson, 1977), and relationship satisfaction (Falk &
Wagner, 1985; Franzoi, Davis & Young, 1985; Long & Andrews, 1990).
Of all human interactions, conflict situations can perhaps benefit
most from perspective-taking. When two points of view are at odds,
successfully understanding one another is the first step towards a
peaceful and constructive resolution. Yet because two points of view
are at odds, these are the very situations in which perspective-taking
is most difficult. Picking a side is easy; understanding and
synthesizing two conflicting points of view is a much more difficult
task. For example, you may have little trouble understanding and
legitimizing a friend's troubles, but when your friend's troubles are the
result of you and your actions, the task is much harder. You and your
friend's perspectives are clashing; getting beyond your own point of
view to see that of your friend can be enormously difficult.
At issue here is multiple perspective-taking (MPT): the process
of understanding and legitimizing the thoughts and feelings of more
than one person in a social interaction. The two points of view may be
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the self and another, or two others. Unfortunately, past research has
focused on single perspective-taking, ignoring the fact that most social
situations involve more than one point of view. As a result, this
nterature provides little understanding of MPT. Two main problems
exist. First, the psychological literature has not adequately defined the
relationship between related variables - particularly between
perspective-taking and empathy. Second, the perspective-taking
literature itself lacks both appropriate theory for understanding MPT
and appropriate behavioral measures for assessing MPT in adults.
Perspective-taking and Empathy
Because empathy is such a complex phenomenon, it is not
surprising that psychologists have employed a variety of concepts with
which to understand it. Likewise, because psychologists use so many
concepts to understand empathy it is not surprising that researchers
fail to be consistent in their terminology. Most empathy theorists
agree on two main components of empathy ~ an affective,
sympathetic one, and a cognitive perspective-taking one (Coke.
Batson. & McDavis. 1978; Davis. 1980; Gallo, 1989; Strayer. 1987). At
this point, however, agreement ends. While some researchers state
that empathy cannot occur without sympathy (Strayer, 1987). others
identify perspective-taking as the key component (Regan & Totten,
1975). To add to the confusion, researchers have introduced other
related concepts, such as personal distress or fantasy (i.e. Davis. 1980)
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into the empathy discussion. Throughout the Uterature. however,
perspective-taking is subordinate to the "higher concept." empathy.
Yet it may be just as useful, and in conflict situations even more
so, to consider empathy a part of perspective-taking, rather than the
other way around. Perspective-taking apphes to many situations
where the term empathy cannot. For example, consider the friend
who comes to you distraught over a recent break-up. You can
cognitively understand how she feels and why, but you also feel for her
you sympathize. Alternatively, consider the friend whom you catch
lying to you about an exciting excursion she neglected to invite you on.
You may be very angry at your friend and utterly fail to sympathize with
her as to why she lied to you. But you might still be able to put aside
your own hurt and anger to see the lying episode from her point of
view. Thus while empathy can certainly be a part of perspective-
taking, perspective-taking encompasses many non-empathic situations
as well. Typically these situations arise when two or more
perspectives clash. When considering MPT, empathy emerges as a
secondary variable that may or may not play an active role.
Perspective-taking Literature
Although perspective-taking has been studied independently of
empathy, this literature also fails to illuminate MPT. Previous research
lacks the appropriate theory and measuring devices to study this
particular application of perspective-taking.
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For example, while developmental psychologists have extensive
theories of how children acquire both perceptual and social
perspective-taking skills (Fehr, 1978; Flavell. Botkin, Fry, Wright, &
Jarvis, 1968; Light, 1983; Selman, 1980), these models of
development do not explain how adults utilize these basic skills in a
given situation. Assuming, as we do, that most adults can perspective
take, a relevant theory of perspective-taking must explain when, why
and how they do it. Similarly, although developmental researchers
have developed successful behavioral measures of MPT to use with
children, these techniques cannot be used with adult populations.
Many researchers present a story and ask the child questions about
the character's feelings and motivations (i.e. Denham, 1986). For a
child these exercises tap the ability to conceive of another's feelings
and motivations as different from one's own. But most adults process
this way so effortlessly that for them the task usually amounts to little
more than a reading comprehension test.
Not surprisingly, social psychologists have focused on issues
more relevant to adult social interaction. Yet this literature also lacks
appropriate theory and measuring techniques. Previous researchers
have not studied perspective-taking for its own sake, but rather as it
relates to other variables such as helping behavior (Coke, Batson, &
McDavis, 1978), power (Tjosvold & Sagaria. 1978), or self focus
(Stephenson & Wicklund 1983, 1984). As a result, only a handful of
influencing variables have been investigated, and these findings remain
4
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unconnected by a broader theoretical framework. Further, the
studies generally fail to involve multiple perspective-taking. For
example, in the classic Coke, Batson, and McDavis study (1978),
participants were instructed to focus on the thoughts and feelings of
woman as they listened to a news story about hen As they had
personal connection to the womaa this perspective-taking task
remarkably sterile. Taking her perspective did not require the
participants to put aside their own point of view; nor were they
required to consider any other point of view. The insight into
perspective-taking offered by the study is limited to taking a single
perspective, a phenomenon that is quite different from MPT.
In addition to the theoretical lacuna, social psychological
research on perspective-taking lacks adequate measurement
techniques. Researchers have typically relied on self-report
questionnaires, most notably the perspective-taking subscale of the
Davis empathy scale (Davis, 1980). The scale contains items such as "I
believe there are two sides to every question and I try to look at both
of them" and "I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement
before I make a decision." And while the scale has proved very
reliable, it has several problems. First, research conclusions remain
vulnerable to socially desirable responses, as few people care to admit
they cannot be open-minded. Second, people may not have an
accurate perception of their perspective-taking ability, for we rarely
get feedback on the accuracy of our interpretations. Finally, as Strayer
(1987) points out, Davis designed his scale to measure a disposition,
and it is therefore not ideal for studying the process of perspective-
taking. Asking participants what they think they are usually like is not
an appropriate way to detect more temporary changes induced by the
situation.
In summary, although MPT is clearly of theoretical and social
interest, past research has failed to investigate it directly. Further,
previous work in the field does not offer theoretical or measurement
tools appropriate to its study. To address these problems, we
proposed a new model of perspective-taking that seeks to account for
multiple perspective-taking situations and to provide a theoretical
structure for understanding the variables that influence this process.
A Model of Perspective-taking
At the model's core lies a specific definition of perspective-
taking: It is the process of not only understanding another's point of
view, but also of recognizing this point of view as legitimate. Clearly,
we have not taken someone's perspective if we do not know what that
person thinks. But we can know what someone thinks without taking
that person's perspective. For example, a wife may report quite
accurately that her husband feels neglected and shut out of her life.
But if she also reports in the next breath that he is being ridiculous
and is over-reacting, she has not fully understood ho\V he sees things.
In Ziyis' mind, he has very good reasons for feeling as he does. If she
cannot see the legitimacy of his concerns, she has not really
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understood his perspective.! Thus, legitimizing another's point of
view is the key component of perspective-taking.
As illustrated in Figure 1, the model proposes two possible
routes to understanding and legitimizing another's viewpoint: via
automatic, heuristic processing when one has positive "approach"
feelings for an individual, or via effortful processing when one has
neutral or negative "avoidant" feelings for an individual. When we
respond positively to a person, we readily accept and legitimize the
other's perspective. Yet when these positive feelings are lacking, we
must be motivated to think effortfuUy about the other's perspective
before we can legitimize it. Thus, even if no positive "approach"
feeling exists, we can still perspective take.
The automatic route is based on the assumption that our
immediate affective response to a person serves as an heuristic cue
that guides our willingness to accept and legitimize what that person
tells us. If we have positive feelings for someone, we "let down our
guard," giving that person the benefit of the doubt and accepting what
that person says as reasonable. Thus, if a well-liked co-worker enters
your office to complain about a recent indignity, you hear the
complaint with open ears. Your positive feeling makes you likely to
see what your friend says as legitimate. Yet if a disliked co-worker
enters the office making a similar complaint, this acceptance will not
iGranting legitimacy to a perspective does not require agreement, however. One
can recognize someone's point of view as valid while still disagreeing with it.
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come automatically. Because of your existing negative feeling toward
the person, you no longer accept what he says at face value, but
perhaps seek to counter-argue or dismiss it. In short, your automatic
response is to delegitimize the disliked co-worker's perspective.
While the idea that we will more readily take the perspective of people
whom we like seems intuitively obvious, it has never been tested
empirically. In fact, previous researchers have completely ignored the
effects of liking or positive affect on perspective-taking.
Clearly, various kinds of situational and dispositional influences
will shape someone's immediate affective response. Figure 1 presents
a far from exhaustive list of these variables. Perhaps most directly,
mood will impact one's basic feeling of approach or avoidance for
another person. A negative mood decreases preference, even for
those we generally like, thus making perspective-taking less likely.
More temporally stable characteristics of the situation, such as past
history and familiarity with the situation, will also influence feelings of
positivity. Finally, dispositions such as beliefs about the benevolence of
people and empathic concern should make one more likely to have an
"approach" response to people in general.
When the situation entails two perspectives (self and other or
two others), positive affect for the people involved must be relatively
equal for MPT to occur via automatic processing. To provide an
example, imagine your partner coming home at the end of the day and
reporting that the day was just awful, everything went wrong, and he
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or she really needs some understanding. Because you have as many
positive feelings for your partner as you do for yourself, you can readily
put aside your own concerns and understand your partner via the
automatic route. But what if that balance of positive feeling is not
there? What if your partner is late getting home and forgot it was your
birthday? In the immediate situation, you do not feel positive towards
your partner. While the legitimacy of your own anger is all too salient,
you do not readily see the legitimacy of your partner's feelings.
Because of this affective imbalance, MPT can only occur via reflective,
effortful processing.
The model proposes that effortful processing cannot occur,
however, without sufficient motivation and ability. Figure 1 lists some
of the variables that may mediate this processing shift Dispositions
such as openness and flexibility should enable one to detach more
easily from the situation, while dispositions such as rigidity and
personal need for structure will make this more difficult. Cognitive
overload should prevent effortful processing, while motivating
variables such as interdependency, one's moral beliefs, or feelings of
accountability should promote it. Once motivation and ability are
sufficient, the perspective taker must process effortfuUy by carefully
examining the target's situation, arguments, and actions to construct
an understanding that makes sense to the perspective taker.
It should be noted that the two routes to perspective-taking are
doubtlessly not as simple, separate, or linear as the model depicts.
First, the two routes need not be mutually exclusive, but probably form
a continuum along which people rely more or less heavily on heuristic
and effortful processing. Further, reflective thinking, perspective-
taking, and preference probably form a feedback loop. Given Zajonc's
(1980) persuasive argument that increased familiarity leads to greater
preference, increasing our familiarity with and understanding of an
individual's perspective will in most cases increase our positive affect
towards that person.2 Coke, Batson, and McDavis proposed a similar
idea in their model of the empathic mediation of helping (1978): by
empathizing, liking for the individual increases, which in turn
increases our willingness to help. Finally, positive approach feelings
do not guarantee perspective-taking via the automatic route, although
they are probably a necessary condition. While in most situations
understanding is probably more an issue of "willing" rather than
"able," a completely unfamiliar point of view may require an individual
to effortfully examine the situation simply to comprehend it
Immediate affective response will still determine the willingness and
ease with which one does this, however.
As a first step toward validating the model, this experiment
sought to demonstrate the two hypothesized routes to perspective-
taking. Specifically, it attempted to show that (a) two possible routes
to perspective-taking exist: an automatic one and a more effortful one;
2The opposite is also possible, however: Increased understanding of some
(particularly detestable) perspectives might actually decrease liking.
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(b) when preference for an individual increases through Uking.
perspective-taking will increase, and can occur via the automatic
route; (c) when affective responses to two people are more balanced,
MPT will increase, and can occur via the automatic route; and d) when
affective responses to two people are less balanced, MPT can occur
only via the effortful route. Further, the experiment improves upon
previous research designs by using a new behavioral measure of
multiple perspective-taking: It assessed MPT through analysis of
participants' open-ended responses to conflict scenarios.
In sum, as shown in Figure 2 we hypothesized that:
More balanced preference would lead to greater perspective-
taking, regardless of the perspective taker's processing level.
Effortful processing would lead to greater perspective-taking,
regardless of the perspective taker's initial preferences.
When preference was less balanced, effortful processing would
result in more perspective-taking than non-effortful processing
(see Figure 2.)
Because gender differences have been found consistently in empathy-
related tasks (see Hoffman, 1977 for a review), gender was included
for analysis. We made no specific predictions about its effect, however.
1 1
Moods
Dispositions
Willingness to
Legitimize
(Automatic)
I
Relationships
Immediate Affective
Response
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Motivation
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Overload
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Thinking
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Figure 1. A dual process model of multiple perspective-taking.
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CHAPTER 2
METHOD
Overview
In a study on "interpersonal connict." male and female
participants responded open-endedly to two parent-adolescent
conflict scenarios. Participants received instructions either to
consider the fairness of their response (effortful processing), to
perform a distracting memory task (overload), or to simply respond to
the scenario (control). They then read background information about
the scenario characters designed to create two different levels of
preference. This created a 2 (preference) X 3 (processing level) X 2
(gender) experimental design.
Participant^
Ninety one male and 154 female undergraduate psychology
students with an average age of 20.5 years were randomly assigned to
one of six conditions. Participants were recruited from psychology
classes and received extra credit for their participation.
Procedure
Participants completed a questionnaire (see Appendix) in groups
of five to twenty. As all necessary instructions were written, all
experimental conditions occurred simultaneously. Subjects were
assigned to condition by random distribution of the questionnaires.
At the start of the study, participants learned that they were
participating in research on "interpersonal conflict" conducted in
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cooperation with the Institute for the Study of Interpersonal Conflict
(ISIC). A letter ostensibly from ISIC (see Appendix) provided a
rationale for the research as well as instructions manipulating
experimental condition. All participants received the following
standard information: "Our primary goal is to determine how you
react to the conflicts to be presented: What are your thoughts and
feelings about the conflict?" Those in the effortful processing and
overload conditions received additional instructions. Those in the
effortful processing condition read that "We are also interested in
determining which age groups can be good mediators of conflicL A
good mediator is someone who can be fair, open-minded, and
unbiased. Please try to be as fair as possible." Those in the overload
condition read that "We are also interested in determining which age
groups are best at remembering details of the conflicts presented."
Basing our cognitive overload task on Gilbert's method (Gilbert,
Pelham & KruU, 1988; Krull, 1993) these participants further read,
"As you will see, parts of the conflict are underlined. After reacting to
the conflict, you will be asked to recall these seven facts about the
situation. You will not be allowed to look back. As you read the
scenario, please try your best to memorize the underlined parts."
Thus, while overloaded participants were not distracted from the
actual content of the scenario, they should have been too cognitively
busy to engage in any effortful processing.
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For each conflict scenario, participants read background
information about the characters involved, in the form of interviewers'
notes (see Appendix). Those in the equal preference condition
received positive information about both characters, while those in the
unbalanced preference condition received positive information about
one and negative information about the other. Pretesting indicated
"natural" likes and dislikes for the characters. We manipulated liking
for the least liked person (the parent) in each case. A description of
the conflict followed the background information, to which
participants responded in an open-ended format.
Participants also rated each character on a variety of paired
adjectives using a 7-point Likert scale; the sum of these ratings
provided a preference/ liking manipulation check. In addition, they
rated their overall liking for each character, and indicated how similar
to each character they felt. In order to check the validity of the
perspective-taking measure, we also obtained a self-report measure of
which character the participants sided with; they rated their reaction
to the scenario on a 9-point scale, with 1 indicating complete support
for the adolescent, 9 indicating complete support for the parent and
5 (the midpoint) indicating equal support for both characters. Finally,
participants in the overload condition were asked to recall the
underlined items. After participants responded in this manner to
both scenarios (in randomized order), they rated their agreement with
a series of statements about their reactions to the experimental task
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itself (see Appendix). Once participants completed all parts of
questionnaire, they received feedback explaining the true purp.
Through pretesting with a sample of 150 participants we chose
two of three conflict scenarios (see Appendix) adapted and developed
from material used in mediation training. Pilot studies demonstrated
that they are sufflciently ambiguous to permit a wide range of
responses, and sufficiently engaging to evoke very telling responses.
Each scenario describes a conflict between a parent and an adolescent
- a mother and daughter, or a father and son. The descriptions
provide basic facts about the characters and their actions, as well as
some of the thoughts, feelings, and reasons for those actions. After
reading each scenario, participants received the following
instructions: "Having read the above, what are your thoughts and
feelings? Please respond as honestly as possible." They were
provided with a blank, lined page on which to respond.
A team of five coders trained with practice materials from the
pilot study until they achieved a percent agreement of .80. Two
coders, blind to experimental condition, independently rated each
open-ended response. They also counted the number of words in each
response to provide a possible measure of the effort manipulation.
Responses were divided into ideas, the basic unit of coding. For
each idea, the coder determined whether the phrase legitimized the
the study.
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adult, legitimized the adolescent, delegitimized the adult, and/or
delegitimized the adolescent. One or more codes could apply to each
phrase. For example, the idea "Richard is being selfish" delegitimizes
Richard, while the idea "I feel sorry for both of them" legitimizes both
characters. Coders marked the phrase uncodable when interpretation
was ambiguous or when the idea did not directly pertain to an
evaluation of one of the character's perspectives.
Of primary interest for calculating the perspective-taking scores
was whether the phrase supported the parent, or whether it
supported the adolescent. A phrase could support a character in one
of two ways: by legitimizing that character's perspective (e.g.. "Matt
has the right to do whatever he wants"), or by delegitimizing the
opposite perspective (e.g. "His dad has no right to tell him what to
do"). Thus, the four sub-categories were coUapseds into the two
primary ones: statements that supported the parent (legitimized the
parent or delegitimized the adolescent), and statements that
supported the adolescent (legitimized the adolescent or delegitimized
the parent). The sum of the phrases supporting each side served as
the basis of both ratio and difference perspective-taking scores
(described below).
3We originally distinguished between the four categories because of their potential
empirical significance. However, the distinction between legitimizing one side and
delegitimizing the other often proved quite arbitrary, leading us to question the value of the
distinction. Analyses of the four categories revealed no new information about the effects
of our independent variables on perspective-taking. Thus, these four categories were
collapsed into the two more meaningful ones.
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Inter-rater reliability, as measured by Cohen's Kappa, was .74 for
pro-adolescent statements.
.79 for pro-parent statements, with an
average of
.77. The percent agreements were 89% and 91%
respectively.
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CHAPTER 3
RESULTS
Manipulation Chirks
To establish that our manipulation of liking did in fact increase
liking for the parents, we subjected the paired adjective ratings and
the overall liking score to anovas. Analyses for both scenarios
indicated that the liking manipulation was successful. Participants'
paired adjective ratings of the mother and father were significantly
more positive in the likable condition (26.5 and 26.44 respectively)
than in the unlikable condition (22.3 and 23.41 respectively), Fs (1,
240) = 40.43 and 17.76, p's < .001. Similarly, participants' overall
liking rating of the mother and father were significantly higher in the
likable condition (5.14 and 4.82 respectively) than in the unlikable
condition (4.19 and 4.35 respectively), F's (1,241) = 31.066 and
7.081, p's < .01.
It should be noted, however, that the liking manipulation did not
completely eradicate the natural likes and dislikes observed in our
pilot study. Those who read about likable parents still rated the
daughter marginally higher than the mother (27.39 versus 26.49), t
(124) = -1.82, p < .08. The overall liking of the daughter was also
marginally higher than liking of the mother (5.46 versus 5.15), t (125)
=
-!.96, p < .06. The differences in liking for father and son also
remained. Participants reading about a likable father still rated the
son significantly higher than the father (28.35 versus 26.44), t (124) =
20
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-8.9, p < .001. They also rated their global liking for the
significantly higher than their liking for the father (5.40 versus 4.82).
t (124) = -3.58. p < .001.
Examination of men and women's liking scores revealed an
interesting gender difference. Men and women did not differ in their
paired adjective ratings of the mother (24.13 versus 24.62. t (243) =
.66. n.s) or the father (24.32 versus 25.27. t (242) = 1.24. n.s).
However, women rated their liking higher than men for both the
daughter (29.25 versus 26.02, t (243) = 4.89. p < .001) and the son
(30.03 versus 26.66, t (242) = 5.74, p < .001).
An anova of word count indicated that the processing level
manipulation significantly influenced the length of participants'
responses, F (2, 232) = 7.278, p < .001. A tukey's test revealed that,
as predicted, those in the high effort condition wrote significantly
more than those in the overload condition (127.5 versus 97.16 words),
p < .05.
Validity and Reliability of Perspective-taking Measure
To fully explore all the information captured by the new
perspective-taking measure, we calculated perspective-taking scores
in two ways. First, we calculated ratio scores in order to control for
verbal fluency and length of response. We subtracted the total number
of pro-parent statements from the total number of pro-adolescent
statements, and then divided the difference by the total number of
codable statements. This resulted in a distribution of scores with a
2 1
possible range of -1 (all statements supported the parent) to +1 (all
statements supported the adolescent.) Scores closer to 0 signified
greater multiple perspective-taking, with a score of 0 signifying that
the respondent made an equal number of statements supporting each
side.
Second, because length of response might have reflected real
differences due to the effort manipulation, we also calculated
difference scores. These scores were obtained by simply subtracting
the number of pro-parent statements from the number of pro-
adolescent statements. Scores closer to 0 signified greater multiple
perspective-taking, with a score of 0 indicating that the respondent
made an equal number of statements supporting each side.
To offer some support for the validity of these scores, we
correlated participants' self-reported support for the characters with
the coders' judgments. Using ratio scores, the two scenarios
correlated significantly with self-reported support for the characters
(r's = .68 and .59. p <.001). Using difference scores, the correlations
between the coders' judgment and self report were equally high (r's =
.65 and .57. p <.001). These correlations indicate that there is fairly
strong agreement between the coders' judgments and the
participants' judgments.
To establish that the components of our primary dependent
measure formed an internally consistent and reliable scale, we
calculated reliability coefficients. The results indicated that both ratio
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and difference scores, averaged across coder and scenario, formed a
reliable scale. Using ratio scores, reliability for the two scenarios was
quite high when averaged across coders (mother/ daughter alpha =
.92.
father/son alpha = .87). Using difference scores, reliability between
coders was even higher (mother/ daughter alpha =
.95. father/son
alpha = .94). Thus, the components of the perspective-taking measure
formed an internally consistent perspective-taking scale.
The two scenarios were averaged into a single perspective-
taking score because the pattern of results for the two scenarios was
identical. Participants of both genders responded primarily to the
characters as parents or children, and were not affected by the
characters' gender. As a result, future analyses are presented as
averages across the two scenarios.
Analyses of Dependent Variables
Ratio Scores
A 2 (likable versus, unlikable) X 3 (effort versus, overload versus,
control) X 2 (male versus, female) anova of the ratio scores only
partially supported our predictions. A significant main effect for liking
emerged. As predicted, those who read about a likable parent were
significantly more fair than those who read about an unlikable parent
(.47 versus .53). F (1, 226) = 4.73, p < .05. There were no significant
differences due to processing level or gender.
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Differenc e Scores
A 3-way anova (identical to the one used above) resulted in three
main effects. As predicted and as reported above, those in the likable
condition were significantly more fair than those in the unlikable
condition (2.79 versus 3.77). F (1, 228) = 4.53, p < .05. A main effect
for gender also emerged, with men writing significantly more
balanced responses than women (2.54 versus 3.81), F (1. 228) =
19.19, p < .01. The effect of processing level was also significant, F (2,
228) = 5.55, p < .0 1. However, examination of the means revealed
that the significant differences were not in the predicted direction.
While we predicted that those instructed to be fair would in fact be
more fair than those in the overload condition, we found just the
opposite. The overloaded participants were most fair (2.41), control
participants were moderately fair (3.49), while high-effort participants
were least fair (3.90) (see figure 3). Tukey comparisons at the .05
level indicated that only the difference between the high-effort and
overloaded participants was significant; the others were non-
significant trends.
Number of Supportive Statements
To more fully understand these unexpected results, the number
of statements supporting each character were analyzed separately.
Analyses revealed that the independent variables had different effects
on pro-parent and pro-adolescent statements.
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First, for both scenarios, women wrote significantly more pro-
adolescent statements than men did. while gender had no effect on
pro-parent statements (see figure 4). Specifically, women wrote an
average of 6.57 pro-adolescent statements, as compared to the men's
average of only 5.28, F (1. 228) = 11.86. p < .01. For pro-parent
statements, there was a non-significant trend in the opposite
direction. Men wrote on average 3.13 pro-parent statements, while
women wrote 2.64, F (1, 228) = 3.38, p < .07.
Not surprisingly, the liking manipulation influenced the number
of pro-parent statements, but had no effect on the number of pro-
adolescent statements. Participants who read about a likable parent
wrote more pro-parent statements than those who read about an
unlikable parent (3.09 versus 2.54). F (1. 228) = 4.75, p < .05. The
number of pro-adolescent statements did not differ significantly (5.89
versus 6.31), F (1, 228) = ,68, n.s.
The processing level manipulation led to results opposite those
due to the liking manipulation. For both scenarios, the level of
processing had no effect on the number of statements written in
support of the parent, F (2, 228) = .11, n.s. The manipulation did
influence the number of statements written in support of the
adolescent, however. For both scenarios, participants wrote more
pro-adolescent statements when asked to be fair (6.78). but wrote
fewer pro-adolescent statements when cognitively busy (5.18). with
control participants falling in between (6.30) (see figure 5), F (2, 228)
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= 7.17. p < .01. Tukey tests revealed that at the .05 level, the overload
group differed significantly both from the control group and from the
effort group. The difference between the effort group and the control
group was a non-significant trend.
To review, while liking increased supportive statements for the
parent it had no effect on the number of supportive statements for
the adolescent. In contrast, participants wrote the same number of
statements in support of the parent regardless of level of processing.
Instead, effort instructions influenced the number of statements
written in support of the adolescent Those in the overload condition
wrote the fewest pro-adolescent statements, while those in the high-
effort condition wrote the most pro-adolescent statements.
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Figure 3. Perspective-taking difference scores as a function of the
level of processing. Because higher scores indicate larger differences
in support for the two characters, higher scores indicate /ess
perspective taking.
27
7i
B
O
5-
4-
3
2
Male
"^^^ Pro-Adolescent Statements
• Pro-Parent Statements
Female
Gender
Figure 4. The effect of gender on the number of statements written
support of each character.
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Figure 5. The effect of level of processing on the number of
statements written in support of each character.
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CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION
The findings present a complex picture that only partially
supports the proposed dual-process model. Specifically, the current
data support the hypothesized influence of affective response on
perspective-taking: Increased liking for the less liked character led to
more MPT - that is, it increased the number of supporting statements
for this character. It seems that affective response works on a
continuum: The smaller the difference in preference, the greater the
MPT. This is true even for cognitively overloaded respondents,
supporting the model's assertion that the link between liking and
legitimizing a perspective is an heuristic one.
While not predicted, the data also indicate that men engage in
more MPT than women do ~ that is, women tend to write more
statements supporting the preferred character than men do. In light
of the fact that women liked the adolescents significantly more than
the men did, however, this result also follows from the model.
According to the model, a greater difference in positive affect will lead
to less MPT. Thus the fact that women both liked the adolescents
more and took the parents' perspectives less may provide additional
support for the importance of liking in perspective-taking.
The data do not support the predicted influence of increased
effort on MPT, however. While the model predicted that participants
who engaged in effortful processing would be most fair, they were in
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fact least fair
- that is, they wrote more statements supporting the
preferred character than those performing a distracting memory task.
Thus, while the data support the existence of the automatic route to
perspective-taking, they offer no support for the effortful one.
Although the effects of the effort manipulation were unexpected,
they are not unintelligible. Participants' feelings of positive affect for
the adolescent were probably stronger than their feelings for the adult.
While very few (if any) of our respondents had been parents, all had
quite recently experienced adolescence and breaking ties with family.
Perhaps the issues the teens dealt with had a familiarity and personal
relevance that the parents' issues did not. Participants partially
overcame this natural affiliation when presented with a likable parent.
But the instructions, "please try to be as fair as possible" seem to have
merely encouraged participants to elaborate on the position they
already favored: They channeled their effort into defending their
affect-based preference, not into re-examining their opinions.
Instead, fairness was surprisingly best promoted by distracting
respondents, thus preventing them from elaborating on their
preferred perspective.
Recent empirical and theoretical work support this
interpretation. For example, Thompson (1995) examined the effects
of motivation and partisanship on observers' estimation of the
incompatibility of negotiators' goals. She found that while involved
(motivated) non-partisan observers were quite accurate in assessing
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the degree of overlapping goals, involved partisan observers were
remarkably inaccurate, making more biased judgments than
completely uninvolved partisans or non-partisans. Just as her partisan
participants exhibited exaggerated bias when motivated to be effortful,
our participants (most of whom were partisan in support of the
adolescent) exhibited exaggerated bias when motivated to be effortful.
Partisanship, or preference for one side over another, emerges as a
factor capable of undermining the effects of accuracy-motivating
instructions.
Baumeister and Newman (1994) provide a theoretical
framework for understanding how motivated effort can be so
mischanneled. They describe two main modes of motivated cognitive
self-regulation that shape the inference and decision process: the
intuitive scientist, who seeks accurate conclusions, versus the intuitive
lawyer, who seeks support for a particular conclusion. These authors
contend that one's motivational goal will guide each step of the
decisional process, from gathering evidence to assessing implications
to integrating one's conclusions into a final judgment. Applied to the
present findings, positive affect or partisanship may motivate
respondents to be intuitive lawyers, to reach a particular conclusion in
support of their preferred viewpoint. The authors further note that
intuitive lawyers want very much to believe they are scientists making
unimpeachable decisions: Their biased self-regulation process will
therefore be subtle, covert, and below awareness (Baumeister &
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Newman, 1994). Thus, even respondents trying hard to be fair may be
unaware of their bias.
An alternative explanation for the unexpected effort results is
that participants interpreted the word "fair" to mean "determine who
is right" as a judge would. If so, then participants attempting to be
fair did so by carefully explaining why they felt their (previous)
judgment was the correct one. While this is certainly possible, it
seems less likely than the above explanation. The effort instructions
also specifically encouraged participants to be unbiased, and to be
good mediators. Both of these concepts should have made clear to
participants that they were to consider both sides of the conflict.
Nevertheless, to clarify this issue current research efforts are
investigating more directly the effects of different judgment goals and
instructions on perspective-taking.
While clearly demonstrating the important role of affective
response in MPT, the study leaves many questions unanswered. Most
fundamentally, participants responded to only one type of conflict
situation. Yet conflict situations differ from each other on a variety of
dimensions that potentially influence MPT. It seems quite plausible,
for example, that someone's response to two conflicting friends might
differ significantly from that person's response to an adolescent and a
parent. The parent-adolescent scenarios used in the present
investigation have several features that limit the conclusions one can
draw from the present findings.
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First, the parent-adolescent dichotomy is a unique relationship
that confounds many variables that potentially influence participants'
affective response. For example, the disliked adults were more
powerful, less similar, and arguably more responsible for a resoluti
than the adolescents. Because so many variables are confounded, thi
study offers no insight into which component(s) of the relationship
influences participants' affective responses the most Future research
must determine whether preference is a generalized response based
on any (or all) of these factors, or if some play a more important role
than others.
Second, a difference in positive affect between the two scenario
characters remained despite the positive liking manipulation. Possibly
the effort motivation was simply not powerful enough to overcome
these differences in liking, and perhaps with either smaller
differences or greater motivation participants would have exhibited
the predicted increase in MPT. Alternatively. Thompson's (1995) and
Baumeister and Newman's (1994) work suggest that the introduction
of any preference or partisanship may motivate people to reach a
particular conclusion, thus directing their increased effort towards a
biased end. Research is already under way using a scenario with two
peers and a smaller liking difference. Should increased effort again
lead to increased bias, the role of motivation and effort in MPT will
have to be seriously rethought.
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Finally, the current scenarios involve only the perspectives of
others. Situations in which the perspective taker is one of the conflict
participants are clearly important ones to understand, and may differ
radically from those examined here. In these cases, we may find that
increased effort has an even greater biasing effect on MPT.
The above considerations suggest that the original model's
proposed two routes to perspective-taking are too simple. While
affective response emerges as a key player in MPT, the roles of
motivation and effort appear much more complex than originally
thought. Future research may determine the magic words and
conditions that enable motivation to effectively overcome preference
differences. But an improved model must also reckon with the
possibility that one-sided preference provides a competing motivation
that may render fairness motivation useless, and even harmful.
In general, the lack of MPT that the majority of participants
demonstrated was disappointing, particularly in light of the fact that
the current perspective-taking task did not involve participants
directly. It appears that considering more than one perspective in a
social situation — even one that we observe from a distance ~ is a very
difficult task for most people. The current findings offer hope for
increasing MPT by creating positive feelings among conflict
participants. But they also illustrate the complexity of applying
motivational solutions to social problems.
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APPENDIX
SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE
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Dear Student:
We are a non-profit, non-political organization dedicated to furthering our
understanding of interpersonal conflict through rigorous scientific investigation Through
cooperation with colleges and universities throughout New England we have developed a
data bank of real-life conflict scenarios, along with information about the participants in the
conflicts and the ways in which the conflicts are resolved. Data we have collected represent
people from all age brackets and walks of life.
The study you are participafing in today begins a new phase of research for ISIC.We are now expanding our focus to include the ways in which outside observers process
and perceive conflict situations. We are interested in people's reactions to the materials that
we have collected and developed since the organization's inception. Our sample will again
include a wide cross secfion of society: adolescents, young adults, and adults from all
sectors of society. Data from your campus will be pooled with data from other campuses
in an attempt to better understand college students' responses to conflict.
Our primary goal is to determine how you react to the conflicts to be
presented: What are your thoughts and feelings about the conflict? We are
also interested in determining which age groups can be good mediators of
conflict. A good mediator is someone who can be fair, open-minded, and
unbiased. Please try to be as fair as possible .
You will read two conflict scenarios, based on real material but altered for ethical
and research purposes. Pretesting on this campus and others has shown that people have
difficulty responding to isolated conflict events without background information about the
people involved. Thus, to more accurately simulate the real world conditions under which
perceivers of conflict situations operate, we have included information sheets as they have
been filled out by our interviewers. This information should provide a fuller picture of the
people involved and the situation they are engaged in.
After you have read the background material and conflict description, you will be
asked to respond to it. Then you will go on to the next scenario. Finally, we have a few
short questions to ask you about the overall research experience and your reactions to the
conflict materials in general.
Please sign below indicating that you understand the conditions and requirements
involved in this experiment, and that you give your permission for ISIC, as well as the
researchers at UMass conducting this study, to use your data. All of your responses will
remain completely anonymous.
Name Date.
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Susan and Harriet
Harriet is 45 years old. She is employed as a project manager at a successful
software company. She has been a widow for over six years and has three children. Since
her husband's death from heart disease, she has hired a series of housekeepers to help her
look after her home and her children. She is the only source of income and frequentiy
works well over 40 hours a week.
Susan is 17 years old, a high school senior. Since her father's death she has done a
great deal to help raise her younger brother and sister, ages 9 and 1 1, whom she likes very
much. She is considered a good student, and has applied and been accepted to three
colleges. She has been dating the same boy intermittently for a year, but her mother only
recently met him. Harriet thinks Susan's boyfriend is rather unsupportive and rude to her.
A problem between them has been building for about six months. During this time,
pressure at Harriet's job has been mounting. To meet the needs of a demanding client her
CEO has made many last-minute changes in Harriet's schedule. Susan has been reluctant
to work her schedule around her mother's. A month ago, Harriet told Susan to cancel a
planned date with her boyfriend because an important meeting ran late, and she was not
able to be home to look after the two younger children. Susan felt this was unreasonable,
because her plans for the evening had been made several weeks in advance, with her
mother's knowledge and approval. She believed that her mother should have been able to
hire a babysitter.
Since that night, Susan and her mother have been arguing more and more
frequently over her schedule and other details of her life. A few days ago, Susan told her
she would be writing an out of town college that accepted her to notify them that she would
be attending there in the fall. This upset Harriet, because she believes the younger children
benefit a great deal from Susan's influence. There is a good college a short distance from
their town that Susan has been accepted to, and it has a very sfrong program in her intended
major. Harriet felt Susan chose the college that is farther away in reaction to their recent
conflicts, and is worried that this choice could have negative repercussions on her future as
well as her siblings.
Having read the above, what are your thoughts andfeelings ?
Please respond as honestly as possible on the attached paper.
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Now we would like you to tell us your reactions to the daughter. Sus.n For each pair ofwords below, please circle the number that best describes how you see Susan
BAD -3
-2
-1 0 +1 +2 +3 GOOD
PLEASANT -3
-2
-1 0 +1 +2 +3 UNPLEASANT
KIND -3
-2
-1 0 +1 +2 +3 CRUEL
NICE -3
-2
-1 0 +1 +2 +3 AWFUL
HONEST -3 -2
-1 0 +1 +2 +3 DISHONEST
HOW MUCH DO YOU LIKE SUSAN*^
NOT AT ALL
-3 -2 -1 0 + 1
HOW SIMILAR DO YOU FEEL TO SUSAN"^
NOT AT ALL
-3 -2 -1 0 +1
+2
+2
HOW MUCH DO YOU IDENTIFY WITH SUSAN'>
NOT AT ALL
-3 -2-1 0+1+2
+3 COMPLETELY
+3 COMPLETELY
+3 COMPLETELY
Now we would like you to tell us your reactions to the mother. Harriet . For each pair of
words, please circle the number that best describes your attitude towards Harriet.
BAD -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 GOOD
PLEASANT -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 UNPLEASANT
KIND -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 CRUEL
NICE -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 AWFUL
HONEST -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 DISHONEST
HOW MUCH DO YOU LIKE HARRIET?
NOT AT ALL
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2
HOW SIMILAR DO YOU FEELTO HARRIET?
NOT AT ALL -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2
HOW MUCH DO YOU IDENTIFY WITH HARRIET?
NOT AT ALL -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2
+3 COMPLETELY
+3 COMPLETELY
+3 COMPLETELY
Who do you side with? Please circle the number best describing your response to the
conflict between Susan and Harriet.
I side with:
SUSAN both or HARRIET
completely mostly some slightly neither shghtly some mostly completely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
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Richard and Matt
Richard is a 38 year old divorced social worker. He has summer custody of his
son, Matt. His ex-wife lives in a rural area, and Richard lives in the city. Ust summer,
Matt worked as a counselor in an imier city youth day camp while staying with his father,
and the same job is available again. Trouble between Matt and Richard began two month's
ago, when Richard called his ex-wife to plan Mart's summer visit. Matt indicated then that
he had made plans to stay with his mother and stepfather for most of the summer, with a
short visit at the beginning and end of the summer. His stated reason for remaining home
was to work for a local farmer, who would pay him better money than he could make at the
youth program. Matt said the work would help him get into shape to play high school
football. This upset Richard greatly.
Matt is 15, a high school sophomore. He is a slightly-better-than-average student,
mostly interested in athletics. (He mns track, and plays baseball, basketball, and hockey.)
His mother is remarried, and he has a very close relationship with his stepfather, who
shares his interest in sports. He is also fond of his young half-brother and half-sister, the
children of his mother and his stepfather.
Matt and Richard agree that they haven't been particularly close since Richard and
his wife divorced six years ago. Richard helped Matt get the job as a counselor, a job he
feels good about because Matt is able to earn money for college while helping less-fortunate
kids. Matt sometimes find the job boring or difficult because he has so little in common
with the kids he supervises. He has gotten a good rating from the senior counselors,
however, because of his persistence and patience.
Not only was Richard upset that he would miss spending the summer with his son,
he felt Matt was selfish to want a better-paying job at the expense of helping others. He
also didn't want to encourage Matt to try out for high school football, worrying that he
might get injured, or that with so many other sports his grades might suffer.
Having read the above, what are your thoughts and feelings ?
Please respond as honestly as possible on the attached paper.
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Now we would like you to tell us your reactions to the son. Matt . For each pair of wordsbelow, please circle the number that best describes how you see Susan.
BAD
-3
-2
-1 0 +1 +2 +3 GOOD
PLEASANT -3
-2
-1 0 +1 +2 +3 UNPLEASANT
KIND -3
-2
-1 0 +1 +2 +3 CRUEL
NICE -3
-2
-1 0 + 1 +2 +3 AWFUL
HONEST -3 -2
-1 0 +1 +2 +3 DISHONEST
HOW MUCH DO YOU LIKEMATP
NOT AT ALL
-3 -2
-1 0 +1 +2 +3 COMPLETELY
HOW SIMILAR DO YOU FEELTOMATP
NOT AT ALL
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 COMPLETELY
HOW MUCH DO YOU IDENTIFY WITH MATP
NOT AT ALL
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 COMPLETELY
Now we would like you to tell us your reactions to the father. Richard . For each pair of
words, please circle the number that best describes your attitude towards Richard.
BAD -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 GOOD
PLEASANT -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 UNPLEASANT
KIND -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 CRUEL
NICE -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 AWFUL
HONEST -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 DISHONEST
HOW MUCH DO YOU UKE RICHARD?
NOT AT ALL -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2
HOW SIMILAR DO YOU FEEL TO RICHARD?
NOT AT ALL -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2
HOW MUCH DO YOU IDENTIFY WITH RICHARD?
NOT AT ALL -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2
+3 COMPLETELY
+3 COMPLETELY
+3 COMPLETELY
Who do you side with? Please circle the number best describing your response to the
conflict between Matt and Richard
I side with:
MATT both or RICHARD
completely mostly some slightly neither slightly some mostly completely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
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Gender Male. Female
Age
Ethnicity African American Hispanic/Latino_
Asian/Asian American Native American
Caucasian Other
Now we would like to ask you a few questions about the tasks you performed in this
expenment. For each question, write the number corresponding to the scale below that
best represents your opinion. Please be honest in your responses, and please write only
one number in each space. ^
0 1 2 3 4 5
Not at Slightly Somewhat On the A Lot Extremely
All Whole
I found this task to be interesting.
I found this task to be annoying.
I found this task to be difficult.
I found this task to be pointless.
I found this task to be worthwhile.
I found this task to be easy.
If you have recommendations for future research conducted by ISIC, please note below:
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